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Abstract  In Lazear and Rosen (1990), they described how discrimination in the 
promotion process stops women from progressing up the job-ladders.  Such discrimination is 
presumably rational and operates on the belief that women are more likely to separate from 
labour market activities than men.  Here we test this assumption – discrimination in 
promotion is driven by the likelihood of separation given the characteristics of the workers – 
by empirically estimating an extended form of their model.  The personnel record of a large 
financial firm in Britain covering 155 months is used in this study.  We estimated the L&R 
model under two specifications: gender discrimination and discrimination against people who 
are likely to separate from the firm.  Our results show that the form of gender discrimination 
is just as it was described in the model, but the link between tendency to separate and 
discrimination is not.  This shows that within this firm, gender discrimination is not really just 
rational statistical discrimination as assumed in L&R’s model. 
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1  Introduction 
The fact that women are paid less than men is well established.  Previous studies have found 
while men and women tend to be treated equally within jobs, women are still paid less than 
men as they are more likely to work in low paid jobs.  Women tend to take jobs with fewer 
career prospects for promotions or they may be discriminated against in the promotion 
process.  The reason suggested by Lazear and Rosen (1990) is that the distribution of non-
market opportunities for women dominates that for men, so that women are more likely to 
separate from the labour force and they do so earlier than men.  Workers who are going to 
separate from the job market would choose occupations that have lower requirements in 
human capital and where the income-tenure profiles are flatter.  These tend to be females.  On 
the other hand, employers are reluctant to provide trainings to female employees as the 
expected return from training them is low due to their high separation rates.  Since many 
promotion-track jobs require on-the-job trainings, this results in fewer women being promoted 
and even less in well paid jobs.  This also leads to lower human capital accumulation and 
lower pay amongst women even though no discernible differences can be found between men 
and women in the same jobs. 
 
Since training is costly, employers would only want to train those who intend to stay on the 
job.  However it is not obvious who would stay and who would leave.  Employers therefore 
create income-tenure profiles for each job so that only staying workers would choose jobs that 
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 require training.  Generally speaking, more training are make available to those who are more 
likely to stay as well as those who are to stay longer.  These are the workers whose expected 
utility gain from working is higher than if they participate in non-labour market activities – 
those who have high ability and thus are likely to command high wages.  Thus for each job 
that requires training, there will be a corresponding ability threshold.  This threshold will be 
different between men and women as women are more likely to leave, which necessitate an 
upward adjustment of the threshold so that the average tendency to leave for men and women 
within the same job are the same.   
While Lazear and Rosen’s model was built to explain why women are frequently sidelined in 
promotions, it can also be applied to all promotion related discrimination against worker 
groups with high separation rates.  Workers who are near to retirement, those who suffer from 
ill-health, foreign workers, and affluent workers who can afford taking early retirement are all 
potential subjects to such discriminatory practices.  It is also possible that a nationwide 
company would administer promotion criteria that vary across regions so that one would find 
the highest promotion thresholds in the area with the highest turnover.  In the spirit of Lazear 
(1992), where jobs slots are well defined building blocks of an organisation, one might even 
observe promotion thresholds and dynamic wage schedules that are specific to jobs and 
occupations.  In short, Lazear and Rosen’s paper modelled a situation where the direct link 
between ability and pay for workers is severed.  Instead, workers’ wages are tied to the 
separation rates of workers or the separation rates of workers as believed by employers, 
grouped by their characteristics that have very little relevance to their ability or productivity. 
Inside a firm, L&R’s model implies that the tendency for a group of workers to quit and the 
belief held by the employers is self-reinforcing.  Whether workers are discriminated in 
promotion is not necessarily related to their non-labour market opportunities.  If a worker is 
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 less likely to quit her job than her employer believes she would, her career prospect with her 
current employer would be unfairly limited.  This pushes her to look for jobs elsewhere and 
reinforces the employer’s belief about the quit patterns for workers with similar 
characteristics like hers.   
Current Literature 
So far we know of two empirical studies that examined several predictions of L&R’s model.  
Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1997) study the differences in promotion thresholds using 
economy wide cross-section data.  Pekkarinen and Vartiainen (2003) study the differences in 
the complexity of jobs undertook by men and women within the Finnish metal industry using 
annual data that cover a span of 10 years.  We are aware that there is a large body of literature 
on a similar theme.  Those studies examine the differences in treatment faced by workers of 
different sexes and ages who have equal apparent qualifications, and the differences in 
treatment are driven by the differences in the sharing the costs of investments in firm-specific 
human capital between employer and employee.
1  We choose to neglect these studies as our 
emphasis is not on the human capital investment side of the story, but on the differences in 
treatment faced by workers on job-ladders. 
The data used by Winter-Ebmer and Zweimüller (1997) was a cross-sectional sample of 
white-collar workers drawn from the Austrian microcensus.  There are two main empirical 
findings.  First they find that a good portion of the differences in the distribution of jobs 
between men and women remain unexplained even when their alternative uses of time, and 
                                                 
1 The term that refers to the different treatments received by workers, usually in terms of different tenure-wage 
slopes, is ‘dual labour market’.  The earliest theoretical papers that purely focus on self-selection include Nickell 
(1976), Salop and Salop (1976), and Guasch and Weiss (1981).  Later papers, e.g. Harshimoto (1979, 1981), 
suggested that it is the sharing of firm-specific human capital investment between employer and employees that 
determines the tenure-wage slopes of individual employees.  One of the latest empirical works in this area is 
Becker and Lindsay (1994). 
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 the values of these alternatives uses of time, are controlled for by a range of variables.  Such 
variables include the risk of bearing a child in the next five years, number of children they 
already have, and home time.  In other words the discrimination is not just targeted to women 
whose non-labour market alternatives are of high values but to all women.  Their results also 
show that women must have higher human capital endowments than men in order to be 
employed in high positions.   Despite the interesting findings, however, the results are not so 
clear cut due to the type of data that was used.  First, the act of promotion in the data was not 
observed but inferred.  The job hierarchy was also superimposed.  All jobs are assigned into 
one of the six grades, and each of the grades corresponds to a level of education which is 
equivalent to the minimum education requirements at entry.  If a worker is working in a job 
that correspond to a higher level of education than she endows, she is assume to have had 
been promoted.  Second, as the sample covers many workers coming from an array of 
businesses and organisations, the overall hierarchical structure of all jobs in the economy is 
hard to define.  Third, the active role played by individual employers in setting gender-
specific pay and promotion structures that are tailored to the needs of their organisations goes 
amiss. 
Pekkarinen and Vartiainen (2003) used an industry-wide data set that covers one out of every 
15 workers in the Finnish metal industry.  It is a 10-year long longitudinal data and the 
hierarchy of jobs is defined by the complexity of jobs, which also determines the job-related 
minimum wages as instigated by the nationwide collective agreement.  The collective 
agreement also instructs that workers be paid bonuses that are symmetrically distributed.  The 
average of bonuses must equal to 9.5% of their basic job-related salaries, with the lower 
bound at 2% and the upper bound at 17%.  The evidence that they used to support L&R’s 
model are as follows.  (1) Female workers are less likely to work in jobs with high complexity.  
(2) Promotions, as measured by the size of positive change in job complexity, are of smaller 
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 magnitudes for women.  (3) Women take longer to earn promotions.  (4) Workers of both 
genders on average perform similarly well at the initial tasks they were assigned.  However, 
females earn more performance-related bonuses than males, both amongst the promoted and 
the stagnant workers.  ‘Stagnant’ workers are defined as those who have stayed at the initial 
assignments up to the date of comparison.  The authors suggested that this result is driven by 
female workers having to jump higher hurdles to earn promotions.  They acknowledged that 
the results could be driven by more productive men quitting early on in their career, but they 
found no evidence that this is the case.   
This data again imposes limitations on what the authors can possibly do.  First the data set 
contains only information on the age, gender, firm-specific tenure and pay of workers, 
information about marital status and the number of children within the workers’ households 
were not collected.  Consequentially they cannot control for the workers’ attachment to the 
labour market.  The complexity of the initial jobs held by the workers are not observed but 
inferred by comparing their salaries with the salary levels instigated by the national 
agreements.  Furthermore, the sizes of bonuses paid to workers are also inferred by comparing 
workers’ pay with the industry’s and firms’ standards.  Second the scope and size of the data 
is quite small (the largest sample is less than 10,000 person-year observations), therefore 
depending on the size of the firms, it is quite impossible to study the active role played by the 
employers in the pay/promotion discrimination process.  Regardless, the authors have done a 
fine piece of work in demonstrating how one can utilise very basic data to provide some 
evidence that L&R’s type of discrimination are in place within the Finnish metal industry.  
Researchers in this area invariably face difficulties when they use economy-wide or industry-
wide datasets as the job hierarchies are not readily defined and are superimposed ex-post.  As 
the number of observations they have from each company is also limited, it is hard to identify 
- 6 - 
 the setting of gender-specific pay and promotion structure.  On the other hand, current studies 
that use personnel records from a single firm have well-specified job hierarchies, but their 
effort stops at estimating the differences in promotions probability between men and women 
(e.g. Jones and Makepeace (1996)).  The gender-specific pay structure and promotion 
thresholds and the active role played by the employer in setting them remain neglected.  It is 
via the employer’s choice on pay structure and promotion thresholds that he encourages 
workers to self-select to jobs that are right for them, given their outside opportunities.  This 
mechanism and its effects might not be obvious if studied on a national scale, as the firms’ 
beliefs on separation rates vary widely from one another and the effects of their beliefs might 
cancel off one another.  Thus if the pay and promotion structure as predicted by L&R is to be 
found, it will emerge most obviously from the personnel records of a single firm. 
Lastly, regardless of what kind of data that are being used, there is no sure way to control for 
relative differences in the distribution of ability across genders amongst the workers we 
observe.  An element of self-selection will always persist, workers might choose jobs that 
they perform best instead of the one that is higher up in the hierarchy.  This should be most 
frequently observed in firms where the wage bands of grades overlap.  There is another 
problem lays in identifying those who are in probation for promotion-tracking jobs from those 
who are in dead-end jobs.  This procedure is essential for testing some of the implications of 
L&R’s model as listed in Lazear (1995) but there are no hard and fast rules about how this 
should be done.  The fact that we observe a worker has not been promoted in the current 
period imparts no information on whether this worker will gain promotion in the next and the 
coming periods.  There is no sure way to tell whether a worker is in a dead-end or that she is 
in probation.  There are many ways a researcher can segregate workers into dead-end or 
probation.  Different segregate methods make it hard to compare results of similar works by 
different researchers using different datasets.  This is especially given that the proportion of 
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 workers on probation across genders can vary an awful lot depending on the occupation. 
Combining these two factors, it becomes perfectly possible to find both promoted and 
stagnant females perform better than their male counterparts.  Yet due to the lack of 
background information one cannot feel any surer whether he or she has actually observed the 
relationships between genders, performance thresholds for promotions and pay that was 
specified in L&R’s model. 
Summing up, both studies compare the job distribution across genders.  Winter-Ebmer and 
Zweimüller controlled for labour market attachment by a number of personal characteristics 
and promotion thresholds are assumed to be a function of tenure and education.  Pekkarinen 
and Vartiainen compare the bonuses of stagnant and promoted workers by genders as well as 
a duration model for promotion.  Both studies examined the predictions of L&R’s model in 
piecemeal.  Such predictions, when viewed in separation, can equally be the results of any 
discrimination model.  Neither succeeds in studying all facets of L&R’s model in one fell 
scoop.  That is, the inquisition as to whether the choice variables – the promotion thresholds, 
the salaries paid prior to promotions and the length of time spent in grade prior to promotions 
– are interacting as they were described in the model has remain unexplored.  Furthermore, 
neither study answers the following questions.  Do women suffer promotion thresholds and 
pay levels that are different from men because firms have correctly expected and responded to 
women’s higher tendency to separate from the labour market?  Or are these practices purely 
driven by discrimination and irrational beliefs that has no relevance to workers’ tendency to 
separate from the firm?  In short, do firms statistically discriminate or do they just 
discriminate?  In this study we seek to examine both issues using the personnel records of a 
single firm. 
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 Our data is drawn from the monthly payroll records of a financial firm in Britain.  The 
hierarchical structure of jobs in the firm is well specified.  We have information on workers 
regarding promotions, grades, pay, tenure and tenure within grade, performances, contract 
hours, marital status, age, gender, disability, ethnic origin and the number of children.  We 
also have information regarding overtime and pay, education and professional qualifications, 
and number of children.  Promotions are directly observed without making any ad hoc 
assumptions. 
For examining the first issue, we estimate the normal form of L&R’s model, with a dummy 
for males to control for their lower tendency to quit from the labour market and also from 
their jobs.  To examine the second issue, we first create an index of workers’ tendency to 
separate from the firm.  We then estimate the normal form of L&R’s model again, but 
replacing the male dummy with the negative value of this tendency to separate index.  The 
results of the first and the second L&R estimations are then compared.  If pay and promotion 
discrimination against women within this firm is really because women are more likely to quit, 
then the properties of the results for these two estimations should be the same.  If, however, 
we find women are being punished for their lower attachment to the labour market but the 
same punishment were not levied on workers with other attributes that can equally contribute 
to lower labour market attachment, then the case for rational statistical discrimination in this 
firm is a fallacy. 
In the next section we shall present a modified edition of Lazear and Rosen’s model.  In 
section 3 we describe the data, the econometric model that we shall estimate and the 
predictions we drawn from the modified L&R model.  The results are presented in section 4 
and we shall conclude in section 5. 
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 2 Model 
L&R’s model has two periods and two types of job.  Everybody in job B is paid the same rate 
for both periods, no training is needed and positions can be filled by new recruits.  For job A 
it is more complicated.  Workers in job A must participate in training in the first period, after 
which they will be promoted.  Participation in training is costly and workers’ productivity is 
adversely affected while they train but the trainings boost their productivity once they are 
promoted.  In the training, or pre-promotion period, workers in job A are paid a wage that is 
lower than that of job B.  In the post-promotion period, however, workers in job A are paid a 
rate that is higher than job B.  All workers are given a choice to quit their jobs in the second 
period shall they wish it. 
It is assumed that workers of either gender are identical in all attributes except for their 
tendency to quit in the second period.  This is because females tend to have more valuable 
non labour market opportunities than men.  This is illustrated in Figure 1.  The value of non 
labour market opportunities is denoted by ω , and the two overlapping bell-shaped curves are 
the distribution of ω  for males and females.  The probability in realisation of a specific value 
of ω  or greater is higher for women than men.  Workers’ utility function is U , where  q
)
=
( max , q ω δ = .  Workers work if ω δ >  and quit if ω δ > .  Mathematically, the distribution 
of outside opportunities for males,  ( ) m F ω , is stochastically dominated by the distribution 
function for females, F () f ω , so that  ( ) ( ) mf ωω ,   0 ω >∀ ∞ > FF .  With no prior 
knowledge on workers’ outside opportunities values, employers are reluctant to assign female 
workers to jobs that involve costly trainings which may lead to better career prospects and 
higher total life-time earnings.   
>
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 <<Figure 1 about here>> 
L&R’s model is similar to the human capital theory models in that it generates the results 
where females are placed in low-pay jobs because they have less human capital than males 
and also why they do not make human capital investments that are essential for high paid jobs.  
Their model take another step further as it captures the promotion process that is observed 
within companies.  It also implies that although males and females within the same job are 
equally treated in almost aspects, they might be subject to subtly segregated promotion and 
pay mechanisms. 
The model has some implications for the working of an internal labour market with an 
integrated hierarchy for men and women.  First of all, there will be separate sets of promotion 
mechanism and wage structure for men and women.  Women will on average be given a 
lower salary in the pre-promotion period.  Their pre-promotion periods are also longer than 
men.  Lastly, they will have to clear higher performance hurdles to win promotions.  Women 
in every grade will experience one or more of the three discriminations specified above.  For 
example men and women might face identical performance hurdle, but the women will have 
to spend more time in training.  Another example is that workers of both genders face the 
same performance hurdle for promotion and are trained for the same amount of time, but the 
women would be paid less during training.  In short, according to the model the intensities of 
the three types of discrimination are co-determined. 
The original model has two time periods of equal lengths.  In here, we accommodate the panel 
character of our data better by introducing a time variable, whereby the amount of time spend 
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 in the first and second periods can vary.
2  Workers in job A will spend a proportion of their 
time, v, in the training or pre-promotion period.  The total amount of time is normalised to 1, 
so that workers will only spend () 1 v −  in the post-promotion period.  In this latter period 
workers will choose whether they stay in their jobs or quit to pursue their outside 
opportunities, depending on the relative values of the remuneration they receive at work and 
the value of their outside opportunities.  In job B the amount of time spent in the first and 
second periods is irrelevant as they do not participate in any costly training.  Again, workers 
in job B are given a choice of staying or leaving in the latter period, dependent on the relative 
values of labour market remuneration and non labour market opportunities. 
The rest of the model’s set up is as follows.  Workers’ own ability levels are represented byδ .  
Output of job A in period 1 is  1 δγ  and  2 δγ  in period 2 with 11 12 γ γ − <−  and  1 01 γ << , so 
that the loss of productivity during the pre-promotion or training period is more than 
compensated by the gain in productivity in the post-promotion period.  The output of job B is 




12 0 1 v v dF dF
δγ
δγ δγ δγ ω
∞   +−⋅ +     ∫∫ . (1) 
The first term represents the earnings in first period, second term is the second period earning 
times the probability of staying in the labour market, and the third term is the utility gain from 
non-labour market activities times the probability of leaving work.  The distribution of the 
value of non-labour market alternatives is denoted by  .  The expected life-time earning for 
choosing job B is 
F
                                                 
2 Pekkarinen and Vartiainen (2003) introduced a similar alteration to L&R’s model where the productivity, that 
is the effective ability of workers, is a function of innate ability and labour market experience.  The 
characterization of effective and innate ability in their model follows that of Gibbons and Waldman (1999). 
- 12 - 
   ()




ω   +−⋅ +     ∫∫  (2) 
The difference in life-time earnings between taking job A and B is D() δ , which is the 
difference between (1) and (2).  After rearranging the terms and applying integration by parts, 
we arrive at: 
  () ( )( ) ()
2
1 11 Dv v F
δγ
δ d δ δ γ ωω =− + − ∫  (3) 
Differentiating  () D δ  with reference to δ , 
  () ( )( ) ( ) ( ) 12 2 11 Dv v F F δ γγ γ δ ′ =− + − + δ     (4) 
Cross derivative of  ( ) D δ  with reference to δ  and   is:  v
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) 12 2 1 Dv F F δ γγ γ δ ′ ∂∂ = − − + δ  (5) 
For  0 δ = ,  () () 1 1 Dv δγ ′ ∂∂ = − 0 < .  As  ( ) 00 D = , this means that at any given v there are 
values of δ that are sufficiently low where the workers are better off choosing job B.  To find 
the ability cut-off point,  * δ , where workers with  * δ δ >   choose job A and those with 
* δ δ <  choose job B.  We set  () D δ 0 =  and solve for  * δ , 
  () ( ) ( )
2 *
1 * *1 1 vv F
δγ
δ d δγ ωω −=−∫ . (6) 
Let  ()( ) 22 uF F γ γδ δ ≡−    and that  ( ) ( ) 22 ** * uF F γγ δ δ 0 ≡ −   >   , the rate of return for 
training which is always positive, we can rewrite (4) and (6) respectively as: 
  () ( ) ( ) 1 11 Dv v δγ ′ =− − − u  (7) 
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   ( ) ( ) 1 *1 1 vv δγ δ −=− * u  (8) 
So that if xa worker’s D() δ  is larger than zero, it means that  ( )( ) 1 11 v u γ 0 v − −− >  and the 
worker should be in job A.  Workers should be in job B if  ( ) ( ) 11 0 v u 1 γ v − −− < .   
 
Differentiating equation (8) with reference to  , we arrive at:  v
  ()() () 11
**






−+ −= − +
∂∂
 (9) 
and by rearranging the terms we discover the equation that describes the correlation between 
* δ  and v, 












∂− + u +
 (10) 
Since the numerator on the RHS is always positive, therefore whether  * v δ ∂ ∂  is negative or 
positive is determined by the denominator.  The result is that  *0 v δ ∂ ∂>  if   and  () 0 D δ >
*0 v δ ∂∂ <  if  () 0 D δ < .  This proof shows that the ability cut-off point ( * δ ) is an 
increasing function of the amount of time spent in the pre-promotion period.  This means that 
the more training one needs to take up for job A, the higher is the performance thresholds for 
promotion.  Since workers in job B do not participate in trainings and do not experience 
promotions, therefore the case where  * v 0 δ ∂ ∂<  and  * δ δ <   shed no lights on what we 
expect to observe.  The slope of this relationship between  * δ  and   is determined by the 
adverse effects of trainings on productivity,
v
( ) 1 1 v γ − , and the rate of return from training, 
.  Empirically the latter can be measured by the expected salary (mean salary of all  () 1 v − u
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 employees in the grades above the worker’s) multiplies by the number of working years prior 
to retirement (average retirement age minus the worker’s age). 
 
As the distribution of alternatives shifts, so will  F * δ , which is why the male and female 
thresholds differ.  Let  () ( ) ; mm m FF ω ωα ≡  and  ( ) ( ) ; f f FF f ω ωα ≡ , where  m α  and  f α  are 
distribution shifters.  We can also view α  as a measure of how closely are workers attached 
to the labour market or their current jobs, so that a worker with a large α  is more attached to 
his current job than someone who has a small α .  Assuming that  0 F α ∂ ∂> and  mf α α > , so 
that the  ( ; F ) ω α  of the group of workers with high level of α  is stochastically dominated by 
that with a low α .  Differentiating (3) with respect to α , 



















Rearranging terms and substituting in (4), then we find: 












∂ ∂ ′ =−
∂∂ ∫  (12) 
 
As  ( * D ) δ ′  must be positive because a worker must have  ( ) ( ) 1 11 v u γ 0 v − −− >  in order to 
take job A.  Also, since  0 F α ∂∂   by definition and  > ( ) 1 v−   must be negative, thus 
*0 δ α ∂∂ < .  Summing up, the conclusion is that  *0 δ α ∂ ∂< if  ( ) 0 D δ ′ >  for workers in 
job A and that  *0 δ α > ∂∂  if  () 0 D δ ′ <  for workers in job B.  
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 By chain-rule,  ** vv δ αδ = ∂∂ × ∂ ∂ α ∂∂ .  Since  *0 δ α ∂ ∂< and as we have shown earlier 
in  (10) that  * v 0 δ ∂∂ , we can conclude that  > 0 v α ∂ ∂<.  The significance of this result is 
that the amount of time spent in pre-promotion period is a decreasing function of a worker’s 
attachment to the labour market.  Therefore workers whose non labour market alternatives are 
better than the others will find themselves having to spend more time in the pre-promotion 
stage than the others.  In our context, it means that women in job A will spend longer time in 
the pre-promotion period than men. 
 









This solution shows us that  1 v γ ∂∂  is positive as the denominator on the LHS is positive.  It 
implies that the amount of time spent in the probation period is a positive function of pay in 
the probation period.  The more intensive is the training, the higher is the pay discount during 
probation ( 1 1 ) γ −
v
, the shorter will the probation period be.  Employers can choose to give 
workers intensive training that last a short while with great negative impacts on their 
productivity over the training period, or light training that last a long time but affect their 
productivity ever so slightly.  If a worker has high ability so that u  is relatively big, the 
corresponding   for a given  1 γ  would be lower than that of another worker with low ability.  
This relationship is illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
<< Figure 2 about here.>> 
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 As  11 vv α γγ ∂∂= ∂∂× ∂ ∂ α , and earlier discussion shows that  0 v α ∂ ∂< and  1 0 v γ ∂∂ > , 
we can conclude that  1 0 γ α ∂ ∂<.  This result implies that workers whose attachment to the 
labour market is strong (high α ) will be given higher training wages than those whose 
attachment is weak.   In our context it means that we expect men to have higher salaries than 
women in their pre-promotion stage. 
 
Lastly since  1 ** vv 1 δ γδ = ∂∂ × ∂ ∂ γ ∂∂ , it thus follows that  1 *0 δ γ ∂ ∂>.  It means the 
ability cut-off point for taking job A is an increasing function of the wage paid in the pre-
promotion period, ceteris paribus. 
 
Summing up our findings and assuming that the promotion threshold are identical for both 
genders, women will spend significantly longer time in pre-promotion stage than men.  If they 
do not, they will find themselves being paid less than their male colleauges while they are in 
the pre-promotion stage.  Or they might find themselves in a situation that is a combination of 
the two above with the time discrimination and the wage discrimination substituted for one 
another.  Furthermore, if we allow the promotion threshold to differ between males and 
females, the wages and length of pre-promotion time for males and females might not differ at 
all.  A summary on how these three types of discrimination will interact against one another is 
shown in Table A. 
 
<<Insert Table A here>> 
 
 
Alternative Non-Labour Market Activities Distribution Assumption 
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 Barron and Kreps (1999) suggested that the reason why employers favour men over women is 
because women’s ability is more widely distributed or their day-to-day performances fluctuate 
more than men’s.
3  This is illustrated in figure 3.  When employers cannot observe the ability 
of their employees but know that women’s ability is more varied, they would favour males 
over females for some jobs.  If female performance fluctuates more than males, pyramid like 
hierarchical organisations would appoint males for high grade jobs with great responsibilities.  
Hiring males for important jobs with a lot of responsibilities and females for jobs with few 
responsibilities and where errors are cheap to correct would generate a steadier production 
stream.  This is because male employees have steady performances, and the summation of 
female employees random performances would level out the instability. 
<<Figure 3 about here>> 
 
We can also turn the Barron and Kreps argument around, follow the example of L&R and 
assume that the non-labour market alternatives for women are more diversely distributed than 
men’s.  We can keep everything else in the model unaltered and generate the same results.  
Since the employer is less certain about the value of non-labour market alternatives of women, 
they would again prefer to promote men as the chance of any given man would quit is lower 
than any given woman.  Similar to L&R model where the gender specific promotion 
thresholds are determined by the shifters of alternatives distributions  f α  and  m α , the 
promotion thresholds in Baron and Kreps for jobs left of point F in figure 3 would be 
determined by the standard deviations of alternatives distributions.  For jobs that pay wages at 
levels that are lower than E, the female participation rates would increase relative to men’s 
                                                 
3 Baron and Kreps (1999), Figure 14-2, p. 356. 
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 due to more women having low values for non-labour market alternatives than men at the 
lower end.  As fewer women would pass the upper threshold near to the top end of the pay 
distribution, and because they have higher labour market participation at the bottom end, these 
two forces combine to drive down the average pay of females.  
We have yet to find out whether the two different models would have implications that differ 
from one another, both in labour market participation rates and pay levels, which concern the 
higher end of the ability distribution.  We would, however, disregard the differences predicted 
for the lower end in this study as the firm where we drawn our data from is the British branch 
of a large international financial firm.  The majority of the employees are white-collar 
workers.  We also exclude all part time workers as their pay tend not to reflect the real worth 
of their human capital in the labour market.  Furthermore, both models are concerned with the 
1-0 switch between labour and non labour market participation, the inclusion of part time 
workers in our sample would be inappropriate for studying the model as they now stand. 
 
3 Data 
The dataset we use in here is the monthly personnel payroll record of a British firm in the 
financial sector.  The sample period starts from January 1989 and the last month of 
observation is November 2001, covering a period of 155 months.  On average there are 
around 40,000 full time and 20,000 part time employees in each month.  In the early 90s the 
firm has gone through a phrase of downsizing which reduced the number of full time 
employees to just under 35,000 in mid-90s.  Since then the number of employees is on the rise 
again, currently reaching a level that is on a par to the period prior to the downsizing. 
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 Each worker is assigned a numerical staff identification number, which enable us to trace their 
career movements within the firm over time.  For each worker we have information on gender, 
marital status, age, ethnic origin, number of children, salary, overtime payment, job code, 
branch code, hierarchical grade, date of entry to the firm, date of entry to the current grade, 
performance rating, partial postcode of home and work, the value of territorial and other 
allowances, education and professional qualifications. 
Workers are regularly evaluated for their performances at work.  There are six categories of 
performance ratings.  For workers whose performances have yet to be evaluated because they 
have just joined the firm or have been recently promoted or demoted, they are recorded as 
unrated.  All others are rated on a scale of 5: (1) Unsatisfactory, (2) Not Fully Effective, (3) 
Satisfactory, (4) Very Good, and (5) Outstanding.  In our sample, the percentage of workers 
being rated as (1) or (2) is persistently less than 2% of the workforce, just less than half were 
rated (3), about 25% were rated as (4) and about 10-15% as (5).  About 15% of all workers 
are unrated.  The information regarding workers’ performance would help us to assess 
whether female workers would often have to jump higher performance hurdles than men to 
gain promotion.  If they do and given that performance rates should act to reveal the 
underlying ability of individuals, we should be able to infer whether the promoted women are 
indeed of higher calibre than the promoted men. 
All jobs in this firm fall into one of the 14 hierarchical grades of this firm, which are Grade 1 
to 13 and grade 99.  Grade 99 and 1 are all part time or temporary workers, although some of 
them are full time workers drawn from the firm’s operations in other parts of the world.  
These workers are excluded from our analysis as they are not part of the internal labour 
market hierarchy that we seek to analyse in here.  Grades 2 to 13 can be broadly divided into 
four main levels. Grades 2 to 4 are training grades where workers receive training and would 
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 then be promoted to higher grades almost with certainty.  Grades 5 to 6 are clerical grades.  
Workers in grade 7 and 9 are middle managers and those in grades 9 to 13 are senior 
managers. 
Studying Summary Statistics 
In here we look at the summary statistics to study the gender differences in performance 
ratings, salaries and overtime payment, promotion rates, and amount of time spent in grades 
prior to promotions.  We also tabulate the salaries before and after promotion for both males 
and females. 
We compare the various distributions by using test statistics.  Let us assume that both 
distributions are normally distributed.  Making no assumptions regarding the similarity of the 
standard deviations of the distributions, we use the following formula to calculate a t-statistics 













The corresponding degree of freedom is unknown, but can be estimated with the Welch-
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 Where µ  is the mean,   is the standard deviation, and  is the number of observations.  The 
subscripts 
s N
f and   respectively denotes the values for females and males, respectively.  m
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Econometric Modelling 
The model indicates that performance threshold for promotion ( * δ ), pay in pre-promotion 
period ( 1 γ ), the length of the pre-promotion period ( ) are all co-determined.  They are all 
affected by the strength of workers attachment to their jobs and to the labour market.   
Summarising what we have found in section 3, the relationships we seek to estimate are 
essentially described in the following equations: 
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These equations only describe the relationship between the three factors for those workers 
who are in job A.  On account of this we therefore restrict our sample to cover only promotion 
incidences, i.e. when  * δ δ > .  That is, we only include an observation if a promotion took 
place.  Say if 5 workers were promoted in March 2000, then there would only be 5 
observations in that month.  This choice is justified both on the basis of the model’s structure, 
and on the difficulty in identifying the stagnant workers from those who are still in their pre-
promotion stage in a right censored monthly personnel record. 
 
The inequalities specified in (18) are of opposite or undeterminable signs if  * δ δ < , that is 
the cases where workers have chosen or are allocated to job B.  Since the inequalities do not 
describe these cases, it means that all the observations where no promotion occurs are 
irrelevant to our study. 
 
From (18) we learn that the partial derivatives are themselves functions of other terms and the 
cross derivatives are not equal to zero.  With these information we can express  * δ  as a 
function of v,  1 γ , α , and their interactive terms.  Since v,  1 γ , and  * δ  are all codetermined, 
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 strong endogeneity will affect the results of the equation that we shall estimate, as shown in 
here: 
  12 3 14 5 16 7 1 * vv v δ ββ β γβ α β γβ α β γ =+ + + + + + α  (19) 
 
As this model assumes men to be more attached to their jobs than women and have larger α , 
we therefore take the liberty of using a male dummy in place of the conventional female 
dummy.  We have  1 α =  for men and  0 α =  for women.  We also estimate (19) using an 
attachment index (or negative separation index) in place of the male dummy.  This index 
measures how unlikely a worker is going to leave this firm. 
 
The variable v is measured by the amount of time a worker spent in the grade prior to the 
promotion.  The variable  1 γ  denotes the discounted wage the worker receives in the pre-
promotion period.  We measure this value by dividing the worker’s wage over the average 
wage within their grade, and then we take the average of this value throughout the worker’s 
pre-promotion period.  For example if worker i  works  for    periods in grade g , her  i v 1 γ  
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j w  is the mean wage for grade g  in period   and 
 is the wage of worker   receives in period  . 
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We expect to find the estimates for  23 ,, 7 β ββ  to be positive and the rest negative.  First, 
23 ,, 4 β ββ  are respectively the estimated values of   *0 v δ ∂ ∂> ,  1 *0 δ γ ∂ ∂>,  *0 δ α ∂∂ <
5
, 
and should therefore carry values that correspond to our model’s findings.  Second, β  
represents how the changes in 
1 γ  affects  * v δ ∂ ∂  or it is the cross derivatives 
2 * v 1 δ γ ∂ ∂∂.  
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 Since the numerator   is always negative, therefore we expect to find the estimator of  ( *1 v δ − )
5 β to be negative.  Third, the estimator of  6 β   would also be negative as the numerator 
 is negative while both   and  () 12 u −− 1 γ ()
2









∂ ∫  are positive.  Finally, 
the estimator of  7 β   would be positive as it represents 
2
1 * δ γα ∂ ∂∂   and the numerator 
 is positive.  () 1 vv − −
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We expect to find similar results in the second estimation where we replace the male dummy 
with the negative value of a separation index.  This separation index is calculated using the 
estimates from a separation logit estimation.  This logit estimation calculates the likelihood to 
separate from this firm based on the following attributes of a worker: gender, age, age square, 
marital status (married, divorced, widowed), number of children under 12, the square of the 
number of children under 12, and a fertility index for women.   
 
The fertility index measures the probability that a woman will bear a further child within the 
next 5 years.
4  It is derived using the estimates of a pregnancy logit estimation, where the 
incidence of pregnancy is a function of age, age square, number of children, and the square of 
the number of children.  We used the full sample of the UK-based General Household Survey 
for this estimation.  The fertility index is calculated as follows: 
 
1
Fe 1  numbe   . (20) 
 
Results of the pregnancy logit and the separation logit are respectively produced in Table B 
and Table D. 
                                                 
4 This process is adopted from Winter-Ember and Zweimüller (1997). 




The first part of this section discusses the summary statistics with references to the basic 
predictions of L&R’s model.  All figures are tabulated using the full sample.  In the second 
part we estimate the empirical model we have set out in section 3 and only a subset of the 
sample is selected for the estimation.   
First, we shall se the scene by looking at the distribution of male and female across grades in 








I mf = − ∑  (21) 
where   and  i m i f  are the proportion of workers of each gender being in grade i.  The index 
shows the percentage of women who should change grades to achieve the same distribution as 
men’s.  The index for the entire period is 39.4, starting from 43.6 in 1989 and it slowly 
decrease, down to 35.6 in 2001.  Women are over-represented in grades 2 to 6 and under-
represented for grade 7 and above.  This point where women go from being over to under-
represented seems to have been shifting upwards slowly.  From 1989 to 1990, women were 
under-represented in grades 6 and above.  From 1991, this under-representing line has moved 
to grade 7 and above.  These “switching” boxes are highlighted.  Although the proportion of 
women working in grade 6 is now bigger than men, it is not significant.  Given that the 
proportion of women working in lower grades is still very high, this small shift change has 
                                                 
5 Duncan and Duncan (1955). 
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 contributed very little in reducing the differences in job distribution between the genders 
within this firm. 
 
Performance 
L&R’s model predicts that the promoted women have higher ability than the promoted men.  
To find out whether this is the case for our firm, we calculate the mean and standard deviation 
of performance rates by gender for all grades within the hierarchy.  The statistics are 
presented in Table 2.  Although the distributions of performance rates are truncated on both 
ends and are discrete in nature, their averages are random variable and can lie anywhere 
between 1 and 5.  Therefore there is no justification to forgo using the comparative t-statistics 
specified in section 3.   
We can state with 95% confidence that the mean performance rate for women is higher than 
men’s for all grades except for 2 and 13.  We are not interested in grade 1 because it does not 
belong to the hierarchy.  For grade 13 we do not have enough information or observations to 
compare the performance of workers by gender.  So far, what we find in this firm are 
confirmatory of L&R model’s predictions. 
 
Salaries and Overtime Pay 
In here we test another hypothesis generated by L&R’s model.  They argued that promoted 
women on average would be paid better than their male colleagues due to their higher average 
ability, a by product of the higher performance threshold for promotion.  The means and 
distributions of salaries, net of any territorial and other allowances as well as overtime pay, 
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 are presented in Table 3.  We find that women did not get higher wages in all grades but for 
the highest grade.  In fact, the annual salaries of female workers are significantly lower than 
male workers in almost every grade except for grade 13 when we use all the observations.  
When we restrict to exclude all observations where the workers’ performances are unrated 
(see Table 4), the pay for females in grades 12 and 13 are both higher than males. 
 
These figures provide some validation of L&R’s explanations for the occurrences of wage and 
job distribution differences between males and females in a hierarchical firm.  The numbers 
show that there might be an unofficial gender-specific wage structure that operates to 
encourage workers to choose their career path based on their attachment to the labour market 
and their jobs.  Workers whose attachment is low would prefer jobs that pay them a high 
wage upfront instead of low paid jobs with prospects of promotion and high pay in the future.  
Women who choose jobs with low starting pay but tied with trainings and prospects are paid a 
lower starting wage than men who choose similar career paths.  This explain why we should 
observe lower average salaries for all grades that may lead to promotion except for the CEO 
and vice presidents in the top grades.  It is because it is impossible for these workers to earn 
more promotions. 
 
In table 5, we show the mean and standard deviations of the monthly overtime earnings by 
grade and gender.  Workers in high grades are not paid for working overtime.  As overtime 
pay forms part of the remuneration package, we are therefore interested in finding out whether 
there are any differences between male and female workers in this area.  The only information 
we have on overtime pay is the amount being paid on a monthly basis and the type of 
overtime that the workers had participated.  We do not know how many hours they have 
worked and have no information on the hourly rate. 
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Before we proceed we have to make some small assumptions.  First, overtime work is paid by 
the hour.  Second, similar to the set up of most labour-supply theory, workers are willing to 
keep on working until they reach the point where their privately determined reserve price for 
their time is equal to the hourly wage paid by the company.  It means that, if given the chance 
to work overtime, they would only stop working when their marginal cost is equal to the 
marginal utility.  Let us assume that males and females are given the same hourly rates for 
their overtime.  Let us also assume, although we are uncertain about how valid this is, that 
males and females are given the same opportunity to participate in overtime work.  These 
overtime earning figures would give us some indications on the workers’ reserve prices for 
their time.  The more overtime hours they work, the less they value what they would 
otherwise do if they did not work.  Workers whose attachment to the labour market is strong 
would be willing to work more overtime and vice versa. 
 
The mean overtime earnings for women are lower than men in all grades.  This indicates that 
the women in this firm are less interested in working overtime and are less attached to their 
jobs than men. 
 
 
Salaries and Expected Pay Rise upon Promotion 
In table 6 we present the mean expected pay rise upon being promoted by gender and grade.  
If the firm has gender specific wage structure, L&R’s model predict that the gap between pre 
and post promotion pay should be larger for women than it is for men.  This is not what we 
found in here.  We have to reject the hypothesis that the pre and post promotion wage gap for 
women is larger than men.    A more detailed investigation is needed. 
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Promotion Rates 
In Table 7 we present the promotion rates by grades and genders.  There are no systematic 
differences between the promotion rates of males and females.  The overall promotion rate for 
women is higher.  Women are more likely to promote at both the low and high ends of the 
hierarchy.  The only grades where men are more likely to promote are grades 5 to 8 and 10.  
As these grades are the most important part of this ILM with the majority of employees being 
employed in these grades, the promotions   
 
<<Insert Table 7 here>> 
Results of the Norminal Form of L&R’s Model (Modified) 
The results are presented in Table E (OLS) and Table F (ordered logit).  We have calculated 
three estimations where the dependent variable is the workers’ performance ratings at the time 
of promotion ( * δ ).  Please note that only promotion incidences are used in the estimation for 
reasons we have discussed above.  In the first and second estimations, we use a gender 
dummy (male = 1) to control for the strength of attachment to the firm.  In the first estimation 
all estimators are significant, except for the Salary in Grade Prior to Promotion ( 1 γ ).  
However, the interactive terms  1 γ α  and  v 1 γ   are both significant, meaning that  1 γ  does 
correlate with the performance rating at the time of promotion via indirect mechanisms.  The 
second estimation is identical to the first one, except that we were dealing with the means by 
grade and gender.  Again all estimators are significant, including that of  1 γ . 
 
The results of estimations 1 and 2 are very promising.  All the estimators are of the signs as 
predicted in the modified L&R model, showing that the form and structure of discrimination 
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 as described in the model really do exist in real life.  However the estimators for the 
coefficients for α  and the coefficient for  1 γ α  are insignificant for estimation 1. 
<<Insert Tables E and F here>> 
The second step of our study is to see whether these types of promotion-related discrimination 
really are statistical, in the way that a group of workers would be discriminated if they are 
perceived to have higher rates of separation (low rates of attachment to the firm). 
Therefore we replace the gender dummy with a negative measurement of the tendency to 
leave.  This measurement is created using the estimates of a separation logit as described in 
section 3.  All estimators are significant but some of them have signs that are not as predicted 
in the model.  Most notably, the estimated value for  * δ α ∂ ∂  is not negative as expected.  
That is, the workers whose attachment to the firm is very strong do not get to jump over a 
lower performance hurdle to be qualified for promotion as it is predicted in the model, but 
instead are given a higher hurdle to jump.  Secondly, the promotion threshold is also a 
decreasing function of the salary in the pre-promotion period, which is exactly the opposite of 
what is predicted in the model.  The estimator for the interactive term v α  also has a positive 
sign instead of an negative as predicted in the model. 
We can think of no reason why the signs of the estimators we have found in estimation 3 are 
not the same as estimations 1 and 2, which is what it is predicted in the model.  The only thing 
we can say from what we observed from the results is that discrimination does occur, but it 
has nothing to do with the tendency to leave the firm.  Therefore the inertia in promotion and 
low salaries experienced by women are not tied to the tendency of them being more likely to 
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separate from their jobs.  The story of rational statistical discrimination does not stand up to 
scrutiny in this firm. 
 
5 Conclusion 
From the personnel records of a large firm, we drew a mixed bag of results regarding the 
differences in career advancements and pay structures between men and women in this firm.   
From the summary statistics, what we observed from the promotion rates and performance 
rates are confirmatory on what L&R’s model predicts – women who choose to enter in jobs 
that lead to promotions are better qualified than men who did the same.  It is also possible 
what we observed was due to the firm setting a higher promotion thresholds for women than 
men.  Either way, whether it is higher promotion thresholds or self-selection encouraged by 
gender-specific wages that generate what we observed, it fits. 
Salaries of women are not higher than men, except for those at the very top.  This is indicative 
of the use of gender-specific wage at every grade of the hierarchy to encourage optimal self-
selection.  Lastly, the Duncan-Duncan Index of dissimilarity shows that women are under-
represented in the higher grades and over-represented in the low grades.  This seems to be 
changing within this firm as the dissimilarity has slowly decreased over the years. 
In estimating the nominal form of L&R’s model, however, we have found that these patterns 
of discrimination are not really linked to the tendency to separate from the firm.  Although the 
patterns fit L&R’s rational statistical discrimination story perfectly when we are comparing 
men and women, it falls apart when we are considering other factors instead of only genders.  - 33 - 
 
This firm’s discriminatory practices are not related to the tendency to leave but to do with 
elements that are not accounted for in the model.   
As it is the same with all single-firm empirical studies, we cannot make general comments on 
whether the discriminatory practices in other firms can or cannot be explained with the 
rational statistical discrimination story.  We look forward for more similar studies on other 
firms from other countries and industries. 
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 Table 1  Grade Distribution (%) and Duncan-Duncan Index of Dissimilarity, by Years. (Duncan Index in Bold Italics) 
                  All Years 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Grade  M  F  % Diff  M  F  % Diff M  F  % Diff  M  F  % Diff  M  F  % Diff M  F  % Diff  M  F  % Diff 
2  0.35                                          0.49 0.14 1.47 2.31 0.84 0.98 1.46 0.48 0.23 0.35 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.03 0.16 0.15 0.01 0.31 0.32 0.01
3  2.34                                          3.65 1.31 5.61 9.31 3.7 5.02 8.54 3.52 3.88 6.69 2.81 2.06 3.61 1.55 1.18 2 0.82 1.1 1.52 0.42
4  11.35                                          23.18 11.83 11.94 26.81 14.87 11.57 25.05 13.48 11.88 24.15 12.27 11.51 23.66 12.15 10.77 22.84 12.07 9.71 21.12 11.41
5  14.64      37.6 22.96 15.24  39.37    24.13 14.03  38.64                            24.61 14.12 39.55 25.43 14.17 40.14 25.97 14.81 40.8 25.99 15.11 40.7 25.59
6  17.82  21.01    3.19 17.57  14.3    3.27 17.5  16.58    0.92 18.43  18.83    0.4 18.67  20.76    2.09 18.77  21.87    3.1 18.87  23.16    4.29
7  22.15  9.58                12.57 24.2 6.47 17.73 24.04 7.44 16.6 23.54  7.8    15.74 23.61  8.61    15 24.52  9.12    15.4 24.01  9.49    14.52
8  15.37                                          3.05 12.32 11.97 0.96 11.01 13.56 1.55 12.01 13.95 1.82 12.13 14.77 2.09 12.68 14.81 2.19 12.62 15.3 2.55 12.75
9  10.35                                          1.06 9.29 8.03 0.35 7.68 8.55 0.56 7.99 9.03 0.59 8.44 10.01 0.74 9.27 10.19 0.79 9.4 10.58 0.88 9.7
10  3.92                                          0.3 3.62 3.01 0.1 2.91 3.44 0.15 3.29 3.62 0.19 3.43 3.63 0.21 3.42 3.5 0.2 3.3 3.55 0.21 3.34
11  1.43                                          0.07 1.36 0.8 0.01 0.79 1.11 0.02 1.09 1.17 0.03 1.14 1.24 0.03 1.21 1.08 0.03 1.05 1.17 0.04 1.13
12  0.25                                          0.01 0.24 0.17 0 0.17 0.18 0 0.18 0.16 0 0.16 0.2 0 0.2 0.19 0 0.19 0.23 0 0.23
13  0.04                                       0 0.04 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0 0.03 0.02 0 0.02 0.07 0 0.07
Obs/Duncan  2796852 3314209  39.435  232850 293379 43.55  230958 292560 42.085  215274 276400  41.035  206183 258943 41.8  202345 247807 41.985  204796 246898  41.73 
 
                1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
  Male  Female  % Diff  Male  Female % Diff Male  Female % Diff  Male  Female  % Diff  Male  Female % Diff Male  Female % Diff  Male  Female  % Diff 
2  0.32                                          0.36 0.04 0.22 0.2 0.02 0.19 0.18 0.01 0.15 0.17 0.02 0.14 0.12 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.05
3  1.39                                          1.94 0.55 1.54 2.19 0.65 1.67 1.92 0.25 1.68 2.08 0.4 1.87 2.07 0.2 1.67 1.83 0.16 1.13 1.18 0.05
4  9.71                                          19.77 10.06 11.05 21.43 10.38 12.13 23.46 11.33 11.71 22.6 10.89 11.71 23.29 11.58 11.78 23.2 11.42 11.7 22.67 10.97
5  15.04                                          40.38 25.34 14.08 37.74 23.66 14.98 36.23 21.25 14.78 34.91 20.13 15.06 34.37 19.31 14.61 33.24 18.63 14.28 31.74 17.46
6  19.33  23.98    4.65 19.67  24.43    4.76 18.53  23.47    4.94 16.57  21.72    5.15 16.48  21.76    5.28 16.32  22.09    5.77 15.78  22.94    7.16
7  23.13  9.49    13.64 22.27  9.51    12.76 20.02  9.62    10.4 20.19  12.31    7.88 19.57  11.56    8.01 19.65  11.75    7.9 19.61  12.7    6.91
8  15.03                                          2.82 12.21 15.1 3.08 12.02 16.12 3.51 12.61 16.76 4.17 12.59 16.79 4.52 12.27 17.41 5.32 12.09 18.13 5.97 12.16
9  10.8                                          0.98 9.82 10.53 1.09 9.44 10.75 1.19 9.56 11.25 1.45 9.8 11.4 1.63 9.77 11.56 1.81 9.75 12.04 2.03 10.01
10  3.67                                          0.23 3.44 3.79 0.27 3.52 3.77 0.34 3.43 4.74 0.47 4.27 4.62 0.54 4.08 4.57 0.53 4.04 4.91 0.58 4.33
11  1.29                                          0.05 1.24 1.43 0.06 1.37 1.52 0.07 1.45 1.78 0.1 1.68 1.99 0.14 1.85 1.98 0.15 1.83 1.96 0.15 1.81
12  0.27                                          0 0.27 0.25 0.01 0.24 0.26 0.01 0.25 0.33 0.02 0.31 0.33 0.02 0.31 0.32 0.02 0.3 0.32 0.01 0.31
13  0.03                                          0 0.03 0.07 0 0.07 0.07 0 0.07 0.06 0 0.06 0.05 0 0.05 0.06 0 0.06 0.06 0 0.06
Obs/Duncan  202156      243479 40.645  194672 234160 39.445 203985 237379 37.775  219332 253143  36.59  223767 246049 36.365 234405 253143 35.985  226129 239780  35.64 Table 2  Means and Standard Deviations of Performance Rates by Gender and Grades, All Years. 
t-distribution for comparison of mean rates, with no prior assumption regarding the relative size of standard deviations 
v is the Welch-Satterthwaite degree of freedom approximation  
The minimum significance level where H0 can be rejected. 
    Male Female  Comparison Statistics 
Grade              Mean Sd Observations Mean sd Observations t-dist v 0 H: mf µ µ ≥
2  3.131295                  0.699312 556 3.2 0.598183 295 1.501942 684.3513 10%
3  3.256206                  0.617468 30,374 3.368094 0.591593 58,428 25.98369 59261.99 0.5%
4  3.438449                  0.694177 217,373 3.493873 0.644409 549,004 32.14276 373784.7 0.5%
5  3.598239                  0.709023 299,661 3.774786 0.719715 1005083 119.2184 498041.1 0.5%
6  3.815804                  0.763696 401,106 3.927241 0.755493 550,078 70.5966 858893.4 0.5%
7  3.176944                  0.534043 460,269 3.309901 0.571915 216,282 91.05879 398395.7 0.5%
8  3.318825                  0.599692 329,664 3.45752 0.617697 68,362 53.69402 96927.85 0.5%
9  3.472999                  0.638733 223,846 3.585672 0.67725 22,557 23.93708 26759.13 0.5%
10  3.570382                  0.659347 78,656 3.701774 0.714344 6,314 14.13999 7203.301 0.5%
11  3.851431                  0.652203 26,762 3.938487 0.666183 1,203 4.437906 1307.698 0.5%
12  3.961366                  0.574756 4,012 4.738095 0.442312 84 15.81744 88.97006 0.5%
13  4.323529  0.721548               68 4 0 4 -3.69745 67 Not  rejected
 
 Table 3  Means and Standard Deviations of Annual Salary by Gender and Grades, All Years. (Adjusted to 2001 prices) 
t-distribution for comparison of mean rates, with no prior assumption regarding the relative size of standard deviations 
WS d.f. is the Welch-Satterthwaite degree of freedom approximation. 
The significance level where H0 is accepted. 
    Male Female      Comparison Statistics
Grade                  Mean Sd Observations Mean Sd Observations t-dist WS  d.f. 0 H: fm µ µ ≥
2  7883.046                2803.354 9,785 7472.705 1470.684 16,227 -13.4093 13083.70738 Rejected 
3  8767.115                2636.926 65,451 8328.686 1540.182 120,934 -39.0811 90186.11582 Rejected 
4  11506.2                2017.043 317,344 11324.03 1688.99 768,243 -44.8015 510117.0042 Rejected 
5  14886.93                3525.26 409,442 14502.82 2133.094 1246161 -65.871 511443.7076 Rejected 
6  18242.07                2848.007 498,455 17727.29 2390.303 696,439 -104.051 954167.4965 Rejected 
7  23118.78                4266.858 619,453 21923.19 3693.397 317,579 -140.566 726485.6338 Rejected 
8  31600.04                7074.338 429,781 30154.71 6447.8 100,990 -62.8933 163134.8329 Rejected 
9  44816.95                11451.73 289,560 43898.91 11701.64 35,141 -13.9202 43711.82623 Rejected 
10  70360.3                20745.36 109,620 68852.38 20158.01 10,014 -7.14793 12034.01858 Rejected 
11  103495.6                27793.66 39,980 94396.14 24682.64 2,211 -16.7572 2530.118243 Rejected 
12  151793.8                43265.39 6,867 147814.9 28065.82 237 -2.09818 276.2359832 Rejected 
13  248383.9                97976.22 1,114 291964.4 130958.5 33 1.896027 33.0697005 5% Table 4  Means and Standard Deviations of Annual Salary by Gender and Grades, All Years 
Observations with Unrated performance ratings are dropped. (Adjusted to 2001 prices) 
t-distribution for comparison of mean rates, with no prior assumption regarding the relative size of standard deviations 
WS d.f. is the Welch-Satterthwaite degree of freedom approximation. 
The significance level where H0 is accepted. 
          Male Female Comparison Statistics
Grade              Mean Sd Observations Mean Sd Observations t-dist WS  d.f. 0 fm H: µ µ ≥
2  12268.8            6662.869 747 10905.2 4710.74 446 -4.12672  1157.685782 Rejected 
3  9295.705              3300.112 31,817 8615.148 1667.895 59,286 -34.496 40726.10252 Rejected 
4  11900.03              1960.248 218,150 11610.54 1589.593 550,000 -61.429 337673.6215 Rejected 
5  15316.42              3660.236 330,287 14799.74 2058.75 1048168 -77.3612 398173.6097 Rejected 
6  18628.99              2698.857 409,771 18132.23 2230.974 563,231 -96.2953 778493.7062 Rejected 
7  23621.46              4086.99 469,342 22471.48 3708.886 224,380 -116.826 482733.0304 Rejected 
8  31991.49              6951.173 350,041 30691.6 6449.869 76,089 -49.6744 117727.4344 Rejected 
9  45209.2              11360.63 245,332 44532.67 11671.11 27,040 -9.07003 32941.75759 Rejected 
10  70832.91              20582.55 93,270 70013.28 19943.23 8,168 -3.55234 9754.237837 Rejected 
11  104786.8              27884.59 35,213 93241.71 24749.39 1,885 -19.598 2148.215249 Rejected 
12  151514.4              40685.11 5,996 156233.9 25289.38 182 2.424216 210.5167717 1% 
13  230430.9              95474.78 917 291964.4 130958.5 33 2.673749 33.23543227 1% 
Total    2,190,883         2,558,908 
 Table 5  Means and Standard Deviations of Overtime Pay by Gender and Grades, All Years 
Observations with Unrated performance ratings are dropped. (Adjusted to 2001 prices) 
t-distribution for comparison of mean rates, with no prior assumption regarding the relative size of standard deviations 
WS d.f. is the Welch-Satterthwaite degree of freedom approximation. 
The significance level where H0 is accepted. 
    Male Female      Comparison Statistics
Grade                  Mean Sd Observations Mean Sd Observations t-dist WS  d.f. 0 H: fm µ µ ≥
2                    60.27771 80.08645 7,464 40.57117 10,391 10,391 0.193314 10391.71841 45%
3                    73.12408 100.9487 52,123 51.36317 80,065 80,065 0.076905 80064.39102 Rejected
4                    163.1844 213.4439 273,223 76.10849 474,518 474,518 0.126407 474517.3335 45%
5                    214.6929 287.1922 347,149 98.27822 739,127 739,127 0.135409 739126.4752 45%
6                    209.8481 252.8967 382,556 163.2126 399,458 399,458 0.073787 399457.3344 Rejected
7                    508.0807 538.8721 103,218 334.0726 32,343 32,343 0.967521 32347.62659 20%
8                    640.1835 686.3218 25,704 444.6491 2,216 2,216 4.136661 2251.772586 1%
9                    766.5538 1086.021 1,299 726.3464 135 135 1.245007 1410.609352 15%
10                  841.9797 968.9121 66 508.7179 6 6 2.793711  65.05469759 1%
11              69.45139 6177.996 4   0    
12                  0 0
13                  0 0
Total            1,192,806  1,738,259 
 Table 6  Means and Standard Deviations of Difference between Expected Pay upon Promotion and Current Pay, All Years 
By Gender and Grades (Figures adjusted to 2001 prices) 
t-distribution for comparison of mean rates, with no prior assumption regarding the relative size of standard deviations 
WS d.f. is the Welch-Satterthwaite degree of freedom approximation. 
The significance level where H0 is accepted. 
    Male Female      Comparison Statistics
Grade                  Mean Sd Observations Mean Sd Observations t-dist WS  d.f. 0 H: fm µ µ ≥
2                  -12.8268 777 10,738 815.9508 1162.89 469 15.28595 486.4210216 1% 
3                  2488.68 36,663 74,996 2588.43 463.5807 65,071 0.745013 75022.63767 Rejected 
4                  3346.541 268,284 381,928 3171.367 224.5437 604,936 -0.40352 381927.3378 Rejected 
5                  3345.565 398,561 492,420 3136.131 153.0264 1136255 -0.36874 492419.0629 Rejected 
6                  4871.269 473,945 576,316 4160.364 691.5735 615,067 -1.13871 576317.2996 Rejected 
7                  8393.874 488,656 642,950 8052.171 928.2469 228,282 -0.5607 642962.0686 Rejected 
8                  13240.77 355,962 436,577 13782.55 1978.199 76,399 1.005568 436730.0334 20% 
9                  25225.87 245,509 289,785 24704.82 4421.456 27,062 -1.1405 291762.6812 Rejected 
10                  32377.59 93,277 109,627 25309.43 9182.925 8,168 -23.6013 114088.3327 Rejected 
11                  48516.16 35,213 39,979 53039.77 21471.31 1,697 8.222284 2104.195105 1% 
12                  99714.41 4,981 5,687 198907.6 76602.61 57 9.77612 56.0047464 1% 
13             207227.5 1 1     0  
Total  10352.38       10537.95  3,061,004  4370.39        3651.206  2,763,463  -933.064    3853723.812 Rejected 
 Table 7  Overall Means and Standard Deviations of Promotion Rates, by Grades and Gender. 
t-distribution for comparison of mean rates, with no prior assumption regarding the relative size of standard deviations 
WS d.f. is the Welch-Satterthwaite degree of freedom approximation. 
The significance level where H0 is accepted. 
 Male    Female Differences 
Grade            Mean Sd Mean Sd F - M
2          0.147141 0.354263 0.162812 0.369205 0.015671 
3          0.05687 0.231595 0.058848 0.235341 0.001978 
4          0.018354 0.134229 0.018651 0.135288 0.000297 
5          0.013724 0.116343 0.008522 0.091918 -0.0052 
6          0.011095 0.104745 0.006746 0.081854 -0.00435 
7          0.00973 0.098161 0.006787 0.082106 -0.00294 
8          0.00763 0.087015 0.006804 0.082207 -0.00083 
9          0.004641 0.067969 0.005459 0.073687 0.000818 
10          0.004607 0.067715 0.003795 0.061487 -0.00081 
11          0.002001 0.044688 0.002261 0.047511 0.00026 
12          0.001456 0.038136 0.004219 0.064957 0.002763 
Total  0.0122528      0.1100122  0.0128714      0.1127198  0.000619 
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 Table A  Signs of partial derivatives 
  v  1 γ   α  
* δ   *0 v δ ∂∂ >   1 *0 δ γ ∂ ∂>   *0 δ α ∂∂ <  
v    1 0 v γ ∂ ∂>   0 v α ∂∂< 
1 γ      1 0 γ α ∂∂ >  
 
 
Table B  Pregnancies for British Women 
Aged 16 – 49 for years 1989/1990 to 1996/1997, and aged 16 – 59 for years 
1998/1999 to 2001/2002. 
Data source: General Household Survey (GHS), 1989 – 2001*. 
* Years 1997/1998 and 1999/2000 are unavailable due to the survey method was being 
reviewed and consequently redeveloped in those two periods. 
 All  Years 
 Coeff  SE 
Age 0.766***  (0.042) 
Age
2  -0.013*** (0.001) 
Child No.  0.328***  (0.088) 
(Child No.)
 2 -0.157***  (0.032) 
Constant -13.656***  (0.620) 
Obs. Number  59680 
Log Likelihood  -4865.46 
LR Chi-Square (4)  1692.83 
Prob > Chi  0.000 
Mean Age (Years)  40.96 
Pregnancy Rates  1.94% 
Average number of Child per woman  0.59 
 
 
Table C  Fertility Index of Female Workers by Grade 
Grade  Mean Value of FertilityIndex 
        2  .0985915 
        3   .1210488 
        4  .1626903 
        5   .1708377 
        6   .1116264 
        7   .0713229 
        8   .0331947 
        9   .0181631 
       10   .0115626 
       11   .0040585 
       12   .0010188 Table D  Separation Logit 
Dependent variable: Separation from firm 
 
Variables Coefficients SE  z  P>|z| 
Total absence in the past year (Days)  -0.00394 0.000477 -8.26  0.000 
Gender (Male = 1)  0.345418 0.016971 20.35  0.000 
Age  -0.04897 0.002905  -16.86  0.000 
Age
2  0.001026 3.51E-05 29.26  0.000 
Married (Ref group = Single)  -0.08771 0.012763 -6.87  0.000 
Divorced (Ref group = Single)  -0.10694 0.028157 -3.8  0.000 
Widowed (Ref group = Single)  0.107416 0.080294 1.34  0.181 
Number of Child under 12  -2.77884 0.111782  -24.86  0.000 
(Number of Children under 12)
2  0.472311 0.027946 16.9  0.000 
Fertility Index (Derived from GHS)  1.437497 0.063469 22.65  0.000 
Tenure  -0.17029 0.00172  -99.03  0.000 
Tenure
2  0.004563 4.84E-05 94.24  0.000 
Disable (1 = Disabled, 0 = Otherwise)  -0.13939 0.01024  -13.61  0.000 
Ethnic – White (Ref Group = Unknown)  -0.20507 0.015331  -13.38  0.000 
Ethnic – Non-Whites (Ref Group = 
Unknown)  -0.04365 0.028181 -1.55  0.121 
Grade Dummies for Grades 2 to 11, All 
insignificant  - -  -  - 
Constant  -3.16393 0.066082  -47.88  0.000 
Obs. Number  6295080 
Log Likelihood  -260167.09 
LR Chi-Square (25)  22883.50 
Prob > Chi  0.0000 Table E  Linear Regression - Estimation Results for the Nominal Form of L&R 1990 Model (Modified) 
Dependent Variable = Performance Rating at Promotion 
 
   [1]      Gender (α = Male = 1)  [2]    Gender (α = Male = 1),  
Grade Avg 
[3]   α = Attachment Index 
Variables  Derivatives                    Coeff SE Z Coeff SE Z Coeff SE Z
Constant                      3.489299 0.040666 85.8 3.380782 0.144986 23.32 4.00798 0.065495 61.2
Time in Grade Prior 






  0.074557                  0.00372 20.04 0.098282 0.018153 5.41 0.013166 0.00376 3.5
Salary in Grade Prior 









  0.120677                  0.043191 2.79 0.206182 0.138702 1.49 0.047017 0.070312 0.67
Positive F-Shifter 
(α , being Male or 









  -0.03352                  0.043212 -0.78 -0.31257 0.172374 -1.81 54.82591 6.369615 8.61










  -0.03456                  0.003331 -10.38 -0.05158 0.014914 -3.46 -0.00946 0.003606 -2.62








  -0.02588                  0.001199 -21.59 -0.02318 0.007519 -3.08 -0.59205 0.145208 -4.08









  0.01476                  0.045891 0.32 0.308386 0.166387 1.85 -10.4794 6.947499 -1.51
Number of Obs          52874 2233 52874
Prob>F         0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R-square         0.0617 0.0763 0.0857
 Table F  Ordered Logit Regression - Estimation Results for the Nominal Form of L&R 1990 Model (Modified) 
Dependent Variable = Performance Rating at Promotion 
   [1]      Gender (α = Male = 1)  [2]    α = Attachment Index 
Variables  Derivatives              Coeff SE Z Coeff SE Z
Time in Grade Prior 






  0.215723            0.011372 18.97 0.036339 0.011072 3.28
Salary in Grade Prior 









  0.346965            0.120263 2.89 0.264715 0.183395 1.44
Positive F-Shifter 
(α , being Male or 









  -0.09198            0.118906 -0.77 151.2516 15.96928 9.47










  -0.10088            0.01024 -9.85 -0.02973 0.010773 -2.76








  -0.07642            0.003504 -21.81 -1.93892 0.512952 -3.78
































Number of Obs    52874  52874 
Log likelihood    -53312.143  -52588.476 
Wald chi2(6)    2503.03  4461.56 
Prob > chi2    0.000  0.000 
Pseudo R2    0.0302  0.0434 